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Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 4/19/02
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,    
 13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$76.98
106.07
102.94
116.73
50.00
    *
120.30
75.00
171.00
$71.40
88.24
96.44
110.24
35.75
38.50
99.20
 *
142.75
$67.07
81.32
92.25
106.07
33.75
40.28
91.70
 *
144.77
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.22
1.82
4.15
3.40
1.40
3.03
1.86
4.43
3.52
2.38
3.05
1.83
4.54
3.34
1.75
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
85.00
105.00
110.00
65.00
92.50
117.50
45.00
80.00
* No market.
In early 1998, the news media reported that
researchers from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the Delta and Pine Land Company of
Scott, Mississippi, had devised a method for develop-
ing plants whose seeds could be made incapable of
germinating. Such a technology would be of little
interest to the commercial seed corn industry because
widespread use of hybrid seed corns means farmers
must rely on retailers to sell them new seed every year.
Farmers who saved seeds from a harvest of hybrid
corn to plant the following year would produce a
widely varying crop of inferior quality. Therefore, seed
corn companies are able to maintain control over their
products and have an incentive to develop new and
better varieties of hybrid seed.
Until recently, soybean seed companies have faced
a much different situation. Soybean farmers regularly
saved some soybeans from harvest, cleaned them, and
used them as seed the following year. Seed companies
were unable to capture the value of plant breeding
programs. Consequently, the companies were primar-
ily in the business of providing services to soybean
producers - saving them the effort of cleaning, storing
and testing seed.
All that changed when Monsanto Corporation, the
biotechnology giant, prepared to market its Roundup
Ready soybeans. Monsanto patented the Roundup
Ready gene and began licensing it directly to farmers,
charging them a “technology fee” for use of the gene.
To purchase Roundup Ready soybeans, farmers must
sign a legal contract that forbids them from replanting
the soybeans and specifies substantial penalties for
violations. Monsanto frequently has threatened farm-
ers with legal action to enforce these “technology
agreements,” and it provides farmers a toll-free
telephone number they can call to report suspected
violations by neighbors.
A technology that would render the seed of
genetically modified plants useless for replanting
would enable Monsanto to consolidate its commercial
control over genetically modified seeds. It also would
allow the company to abandon its unpopular technol-
ogy agreements and expand its control to international
markets in countries beyond the reach of its legal
department.
At first, development of such a technology by
USDA and an unfamiliar cotton seed company in
Mississippi did not attract much attention. However,
soon after news of the technology became public,
Monsanto announced plans to acquire the Delta and
Pine Land Company. The “Terminator gene,” as the
new technology was quickly dubbed, would soon be in
the hands of multinational Monsanto, and suddenly the
technology became controversial.
The Terminator technology is actually based on a
series of genes that act as “genetic switches.” Until the
genes were switched on, genetically modified soybean
seeds would develop in the usual fashion.  However,
before the seeds were sold to farmers, they would be
soaked in the antibiotic tetracycline, which would
trigger the series of switches. Once these genetic
switches were activated, the plants from the seeds
would develop normally and produce their own seeds,
but those seeds would be unable to germinate.
Critics of the Terminator technology charged it
would give Monsanto too much control over the
world’s food supply while threatening biodiversity and
subjecting farmers to “bioserfdom.”  Developers of the
new technology argued it would create more choices
for farmers by providing companies an incentive to
improve crop genetics in the same manner hybridiza-
tion of corn promoted the development of better corn
varieties.
Ultimately, the controversy surrounding the
Terminator technology convinced Monsanto officials
to forswear any commercial applications. Nonetheless,
USDA’s participation in the technology’s creation
calls into question the appropriate role of publicly
funded institutions, such as USDA and the land-grant
universities, in the development of commercial prod-
ucts based on biotechnology.
Historically, public institutions have played an
important part in making new technology accessible to
farmers and small agricultural businesses that would
otherwise be unable to compete with larger companies
capable of funding their own research and develop-
ment programs. For example, until the 1960s, many
small seed companies depended on the plant breeding
programs at state universities, which would develop
and distribute new corn hybrids free of charge. More
recently, in contrast, Monsanto’s success in dominat-
ing biotechnology is due in part to spending millions of
dollars to hire some of the best molecular biologists at
American and European universities in order to gain
exclusive access to research necessary for obtaining
patents and building a strong “proprietary position.”
As the facilities and equipment needed to conduct
advanced scientific research become more expensive
and public universities struggle to replace shrinking
federal and state funding with income from private
sources, the universities’ traditional role of providing
public access to new technology will become increas-
ingly challenged.
Jeffrey S. Royer, (402) 472-3401
Professor of Agricultural Economics
_____________________
Note:  Background information for this article was
drawn from Daniel Charles, Lords of the Harvest:
Biotech, Big Money, and the Future of Food (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing, 2001).
